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The Rise and Fall of Fear of Abuse in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: Most Recent Comparative Evidence 
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Jason J. Kilborn*
Abstract: Prepared for a symposium celebrating the groundbreaking 
career of Jay Westbrook, this Article examines recent evidence of fear of 
abuse of the benefits of consumer bankruptcy and the gradual abatement of 
that fear in modern consumer insolvency law reform. It marshals evidence 
of a recent and accelerating retreat in both the judicial discretion that 
Westbrook attributed to lawmakers’ fear of abuse and other more direct 
techniques to avoid abusive recourse to consumer discharge. Fear of abuse 
appears to be diminishing with accumulated experience as indicated by 
recent liberalizing reforms in Denmark, Slovakia, Poland, Austria, Russia, 
and Romania. At the same time, evidence from countries that have only begun 
to develop policies on personal insolvency and discharge—Croatia, 
Bulgaria, China, and Saudi Arabia—indicate that fear, or at least resistance 
to discharge relief, clearly persists. 
Law is fundamentally a social science. Its theories usually can and 
should be tested based not just on the behavior of appellate courts but also on 
anthropological evidence of the actual frontline form and effect of law¶s
regulation of human behavior. Jay Westbrook has led the charge in an 
enormously fruitful campaign of discovery of such evidence in the United 
States.1 Our federalist legal system offers a natural laboratory for comparison 
of different approaches and outcomes in a checkerboard of state and federal 
districts and their various actors¶ often widely divergent approaches to key 
issues. This is surprisingly true even in the supposedly unified federal 
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1. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 17±20 (1989) 
GHVFULELQJWKHHWKRGRORJ\EHKLQGWKHDXWKRUV¶&RQVXHU%DQNUXSWF\3URMHFWDVWXG\RIGHEWRUV
in ten federal judicial districts across the United States); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH 
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 7±
11 (2000) (discussing Phase II of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which focused on debtors in 
sixteen federal districts); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981–1991,
68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 122±24 (1994) (same). 
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consumer bankruptcy system. Opportunities for comparative analysis are 
supercharged, however, when one moves outside the United States and 
beyond the Anglo-American context on which most consumer bankruptcy 
scholarship has focused. 
Almost exactly twenty years ago, Jay extrapolated his research on U.S. 
consumer bankruptcy to the new frontier of emerging consumer insolvency 
systems in Europe. In so doing, he launched a field of scholarship that would 
yield rich rewards. Before the turn of the twenty-first century, there was all 
but nothing in Europe to compare with Anglo-American consumer 
bankruptcy practice.2 By the late 1990s, however, the first consumer 
discharge procedures were emerging in Northern Europe and had produced a 
foundation of operational results for comparison. Jay was among the first 
Americans to seize this new opportunity. 
In a short commentary on one of the earliest comparative consumer 
bankruptcy conferences in Europe, Jay noted the potential of comparative 
perspectives on the topic.3 At that time, he was studying judicial discretion 
and a resulting pernicious phenomenon that he referred to as ³local legal 
culture,´ marked by persistent disparate treatment of similarly situated 
consumer debtors across the United States.4 The comparative conference 
offered Jay a chance to extrapolate his U.S. findings to the few emerging 
consumer discharge regimes in Europe and to develop hypotheses as to the 
causes of the phenomenon of local legal culture. He noted that even the sparse 
European data revealed the emergence of local legal culture as a consequence 
of judicial discretion, particularly in determining (1) whether certain debtors 
should have access to a discharge and (2) the duration of the payment plan 
imposed on debtors as a quid pro quo for earning discharge relief.5
In light of his U.S. research, augmented by this limited set of 
comparative observations, Jay tentatively suggested a cause for the discretion 
producing these local legal culture disparities on both sides of the Atlantic: 
he attributed this syndrome to a powerful fear of abuse by debtors of the 
benefit of consumer discharge relief, a benefit that was radical and 
revolutionary in Europe and still somewhat controversial in the United 
2. When U.S. reformers were looking for comparative ideas for revision of the U.S. bankruptcy 
law in the 1V WKH\ FRQFOXGHG ³WKH EDQNUXSWF\ H[SHULHQFH RI RWKHU FRXQWULHV LV QRW D XVHIXO
UHVRXUFH´COMM¶N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 66 (1973). 
3. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 25, 33±34 (1998). 
4. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of 
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL¶Y 801, 803±07 (1994) (applying the concept of local legal culture to bankruptcy law);
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 26±27 (elaborating upon the concept of local legal culture). 
5. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 25, 32±33. 
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States.6 He optimistically predicted ³[f]urther research over the next several 
years in the various countries that have adopted these new laws could yield a 
rich harvest of new evidence and perhaps unexpected variations.´7
This commentary was published just as I was beginning my academic 
career, and it inspired everything I have done since then. It is extremely 
gratifying to be able to celebrate Jay¶s career in this symposium issue by 
adducing recent comparative evidence in support of his thesis in that early 
commentary and by providing a small taste of the ³rich harvest of new 
evidence´8 from the most recent developments in consumer bankruptcy in 
Europe and beyond. As Jay predicted, European authorities have been 
extremely concerned about debtors abusing the new discharge regimes, and 
common impediments to relief have been far more obvious and imposing 
than the nuanced effects of discretion and the resulting local legal culture. 
Twenty years after Jay identified this fear of abuse, however, a thaw is 
manifest in the icy European attitude, as evidenced in particular by 
developments over just the past few months. Fear of abuse²and 
discretionary or statutory mechanisms for making the path to discharge 
narrower and more onerous²appears to be diminishing with time and 
experience. This message needs to be broadcast more effectively, as several 
projects for new consumer discharge laws reveal a resurgence of fear of abuse 
or at least reticence to embrace the notion of discharge relief. Thus, the 
vicious cycle repeats itself. 
This Article presents the most recent evidence of these propositions in 
three segments. Part I discusses three regimes that exemplify the trends 
discussed above²that is, extremely fearful, highly discretionary procedures 
that abruptly reversed course on fear of abuse after a decade or two of 
operation but retained significant court discretion (Denmark, Slovakia, 
Poland). Part II announces some of the most recent developments, including 
notable harbingers of both a softening of fear of abuse and a reining-in of 
discretion across Europe (Austria, Russia, Croatia, Romania). Part III looks 
to the future of several nascent personal insolvency regimes-in-waiting, 
which evidence a return to square one and a high degree of fear or resistance 
to discharge (Bulgaria, China, Saudi Arabia). Like Jay¶s commentary, mine 
here is designed primarily to stimulate interest in and discussions of 
developments of which many followers of English-language legal 
scholarship will be unaware9 but which hold great potential for revealing 
6. Id. at 28. 
7. Id. at 33±34. 
8. Id. at 34. 
9. See id. at 25±QRWLQJ WKDW WKHYDOXHRI WKHSDSHU³LOO OLH LQVWLXODWLQJGLVFXVVLRQE\
referring the reader to a very interesting series of papers about consumer bankruptcy that many will 
QRWKDYHUHDG´
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important cross-cultural trends about this important area of legal and social 
policy. 
I. From Fear and Discretion to Acceptance and Greater Standardization 
A. Denmark 1984–2005 
The first story is a bit dated, but it is both closely connected to Jay¶s
early foray into comparative consumer bankruptcy and perfectly revealing of 
the trend away from the discretion and fear he described. Denmark was the 
bellwether, adopting the very first consumer ³debt adjustment´10 law in 
Europe in 1984.11 The Danish law was structured very much like the 
Norwegian law that caught Jay¶s interest,12 as a persistent problem of local 
legal culture plagued Danish practice for two decades and led to the only 
major reform of this law in 2005. This syndrome of local legal culture 
resulting from judicial discretion was fairly clearly born of a powerful fear 
of abuse of this radical departure from the traditional pacta sunt servanda
notion that debts must be paid. Trailblazing Danish lawmakers were 
expressly hesitant to undermine individual-payment morality, so they 
imposed strict, discretionary access controls at both the entry and exit points 
to discharge relief. 
Simply to gain access to the relief process, debtors had to clear two 
hurdles. First, they had to exhibit ³qualified insolvency,´ which implied a 
clear and doubt-free inability to regain financial footing in the foreseeable 
future, by reducing profligate living standards and redoubling efforts to 
service debts in full.13 Second, as in Norway,14 each court had to be convinced 
that offering relief in any particular case was subjectively appropriate in light 
of a series of enumerated factors, such as the debtor¶s efforts to manage debt 
problems and the makeup of the debt load (preferably relatively few fines, 
penalties, and ³irresponsible´ debts, such as debts for luxury consumption).15
Predictably, the highly subjective and probing inquiries prompted by these 
two tests produced widely and persistently divergent results among debtors 
10. This is the usual language used to name these laws in continental Europe, eschewing both 
WKHVWLJDDQGWKHVXJJHVWLRQRIDQHDV\D\RXWLSOLFLWLQWKHRUG³EDQNUXSWF\´
11. Lov nr. 187 af 09.05.1984 om gældssaneringslov [Law No. 187 of 9 May 1984 on consumer 
debt adjustment], af konkurslov afsnit IV, kapitel 25±29 [at Bankruptcy Act Section IV, Chapters 
25±29] (Den.) [hereinafter Konkurslov]. 
12. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 32±33 (discussing the discretionary elements of Norwegian 
bankruptcy law, which produced local variations similar to those observed in the United States). 
13. Konkurslov, supra note 11, § 197. 
14. See Westbrook, supra QRWHDWGLVFXVVLQJWKH1RUHJLDQOD¶VUHXLUHHQWWKDWWKH
GHEWRU¶VEDQNUXSWF\EH³SHUDQHQWLQQDWXUH´
15. Jason J. Kilborn, Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in Continental Europe: In-
ternalizing Negative Externalities and Humanizing Justice in Denmark, 18 INT¶L INSOLVENCY REV.
155, 168 (2009). 
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based on little more than the location of the governing court. In 2002, for 
example, while the court in Odense admitted approximately 66% of its 161 
debt adjustment applications, ³the court in Roskilde admitted only 39% of its 
139 applicants, and the court in Copenhagen admitted a mere 25% of [its] 
828 applications.´16 For debtors who navigated past this Scylla, the 
Charybdis of court confirmation of debtors¶ five-year debt adjustment plans 
presented an equally daunting and equally divergent challenge. While the 
court in Århus closed 41% of its 244 cases with a confirmed plan, ³the courts 
in Ålborg and Randers confirmed plans in only 19% and 15%, respectively, 
of the 136 cases closed´ by each of these courts, and ³[a]s in most years, the 
Copenhagen court had a miserly success rate of only 13% of its 8,689 closed 
cases.´17
For the few lucky debtors who cleared these two procedural hurdles, 
more local legal cultural variation plagued their pursuit of earned relief. Like 
the Norwegian law that Jay learned about,18 the Danish law also left 
completely to court discretion the terms of debtors¶ payment plans to earn 
their discharge²both the length in years and the budget allocated to debtors 
for family support.19 Unlike in Norway, the Danish courts quickly coalesced 
around a standard five-year term, but courts differed widely in their 
assessment of proper budgets to support, as the statute directed, a ³modest´
lifestyle. Some courts allowed supplementary budget items beyond a basic 
allowance (for things like eye and dental care and household appliance 
rental), while others did not.20 Even the amount of the basic budget allowance 
varied widely and was not based on variances in local cost of living, as this 
allocation varied by 40%±50% among otherwise similar districts.21 These 
varying perspectives on appropriate sacrifice and thrift led some debt 
counselors to suggest that their pre-bankruptcy clients engage in in-country 
bankruptcy tourism, moving what we would now call their ³center of main 
16. Id. at 174±75. 
17. Id. at 175. 
18. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 33 GLVFXVVLQJWKH1RUHJLDQFRXUWV¶GLVFUHWLRQUHJDUGLQJ
payment plans). 
19. See Kilborn, supra note 15, at 172, 177 (stating that Danish law originally left questions of 
GLVSRVDEOHLQFRHDQGSODQOHQJWK³RSHQWRLQGLYLGXDOFDVH-by-case and court-by-FRXUWGLVFUHWLRQ´
DQGWKDWEXGJHWDU\SUDFWLFHV³YDULHGLGHO\´DRQJORFDOFRXUWV
20. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 177. 
21. See Betænkning nr. 1449 af august 2004 om gældssanering [Report No. 1449 of August 
2004 on Debt Settlement] 144 (Den.) (reporting that in 1997±1998, budget allowances for singles 
varied from 2,500 kr. to 3,500 kr. and for couples from 4,000 kr. to 6,000 kr.); 
Dommerfuldmægtigforeningen & Advokatrådet, Redegørelse Vedrørende Ændringer i 
Konkurslovens Bestemmelser om Gældssanering [Statement Regarding Changes to the Bankruptcy 
$FW¶V'HEW6HWWOHHQW3URYLVLRQV@'HQVDH
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interest´ (i.e., their home residence) from a miserly region to a more generous 
(reasonable?) region.22
After nearly twenty years of frustration with these overly restrictive and 
divergent court demands, the Danish government stepped back from fear of 
abuse and launched a reform process that culminated in 2005. While the 
reform did not deal directly with the regional variations in admission and plan 
confirmation rates, it relaxed access criteria and standardized plan terms. 
In a technical but crucial about-face, the initial presumption of restricted 
access was reversed. That is, while debtors were originally presumed not 
admissible unless the court was convinced that the totality of the 
circumstances militated in favor of relief, after 2005 the presumption is in 
favor of admission unless consideration of a slightly reformulated list of 
factors ³suggests decisively against´ relief.23 Also, at least for former small-
business entrepreneurs, the ³qualified insolvency´ test was modified 
expressly to provide admission for debtors whose economic situation is 
³unclear,´24 and the payment term for a discharge plan for these former small-
business entrepreneurs was set by Justice Ministry regulation at three years, 
rather than the standard five years for consumers.25
For all debtors, the reform dealt head-on with the local legal cultural 
problem of vast differences in court parsimony in discharge plans. The 
Justice Ministry was tasked with establishing uniform, nationwide basic 
budgetary allowances, and the Ministry took a much more humane approach 
to debtor support. The new budget guidelines exceeded the upper range then 
applied by the courts in most debt adjustment cases by nearly 20%, and 
additional types of income were exempted entirely from distribution to 
creditors, such as state transfer payments for children.26
As Jay predicted, however, local legal culture is quite sticky. The Danish 
courts have continued their rigorous watch at the gates into and out of the 
discharge procedure. In the decade following the reform, fewer than half of 
all petitions for admission to the personal discharge procedure were granted 
(fewer than 40% in 2009 and 2010).27 While the reasons for these rejections 
are not reported, anecdotes from other jurisdictions suggest that most of the 
22. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 174. 
23. Konkurslov, supra note 11, §§ 197(4), 231a(4). 
24. Id. §§ 231b, 236a(2). 
25. Bekendtgørelse nr. 894 af 22.9.2005 om gældssanering [Executive Order No. 894 of 
22 September 2005 on Debt Settlement] § 2 (Den.). 
26. Kilborn, supra note 15 at 1, 176±78. 
27. See DANMARKS DOMSTOLE, STATISTIK FOR SKIFTESAGER M.V.: MODTAGNE SAGER OM 
INSOLVENSSKIFTE M.V., http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/statistik/Documents/Skiftesager/ 
[https://perma.cc/F6HX-JUNN] (reporting the number of debt adjustment applications received and 
the number of debt adjustment applications declined). Calculations were based on ten years of data 
from 2006 to 2016 (on file with author). 
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rejected applications involve paperwork errors rather than merit-based 
judgments. Of an average of just over 5,000 cases closed per year during this 
period, only about 30% (an average of about 1,680) concluded with an 
approved plan. Though again looking on the bright side, excluding the cases 
rejected at the entryway, this represents a 70% confirmation rate for admitted 
cases.28
B.  Slovakia 2006–2017 
When Jay attended the comparative conference in 1997, Denmark¶s
personal discharge regime and similar ones in neighboring Scandinavia were 
effectively the only games in town.29 Since then, the dam has broken and new 
consumer discharge laws and experience have flooded into virtually every 
country in Europe,30 often through multiple iterations and amendments of 
new laws.31 Much of the intervening experience has been analyzed 
elsewhere,32 so this paper will focus on the very latest developments. 
The most exciting and bold departure from a system historically both 
quite discretionary and quite fearful of abuse occurred in Slovakia, whose 
consumer discharge system was entirely overhauled effective March 1, 
2017.33 This amendment was preceded by a long period of disappointment 
with the original quite restrictive law. The Slovak consumer discharge 
provisions were added to the Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring 2005 
with a delayed effective date of January 1, 2006.34
28. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 173. 
29. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 31. Though Jay notes emerging systems in France and 
Germany as well, in 1997 the French law offered no discharge to consumers and the German 
consumer bankruptcy reforms would not become effective until 1999. See JASON J. KILBORN,
EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE 
TREATMENT OF OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984±2010, at 13 n.69, 14 (2011). 
30. But see discussion infra VXESDUW,,,$DGGUHVVLQJ%XOJDULD¶VKHVLWDQFHWRDGRSWFRQVXHU
debt discharge procedures). 
31. See, e.g., GERARD MCCORMACK ET AL., STUDY ON A NEW APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBER STATES¶
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND PRACTICES 333±48 (2016) (reviewing the variations among consumer 
discharge laws in EU member states). 
32. See generally, e.g., KILBORN, supra note 29 (tracing the evolution of consumer bankruptcy 
systems throughout Europe); WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY OF 
NATURAL PERSONS (2013) (discussing laws of insolvency of natural persons throughout the world). 
33. See Radovan Pala & Michal Michalek, Long-Awaited Changes to Restructuring Rules in 
Slovakia, TAYLOR WESSING LLP (Feb. 1, 2017), https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/en 
/insights/rcr-update/long-awaited-changes-to-restructuring-rules-in-slovakia [https://perma 
.cc/FH6E-G8DF] (discussing the enactment of an amendment to SlRYDNLD¶VEDQNUXSWF\OD
34. =iNRQ þ  =] R NRQNXU]H D UHãWUXNWXUDOL]iFLL D R ]HQH D GRSOQHQt QLHNWRUêFK
zákonov z 9. decembra 2004 [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and 
Supplementation of Several Other Laws of 9 December 2004] (Slovk.), http://ec.europa.eu/internal 
_market/finances/docs/actionplan/transposition/slovakia/d7.3-ml-sk.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN5B-
VXKB]. 
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A surprisingly imposing barrier to relief prevented all but a few cases 
from making their way past the admissions stage for the first decade of this 
new law. To access relief, debtors had to pay the equivalent of about $800 
¼LQILOLQJDQGWUXVWHHIHHVDQGGHRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH\KDGDVVHWVWR
liquidate that would produce the equivalent of about $2,¼,659.70) in 
distributions for creditors.35 Debtors who cleared this hurdle faced yet 
another: like most European consumer insolvency laws, the Slovak regime 
required debtors to earn their fresh start by complying with a three-year 
payment plan imposed by the court.36 The amount of payment demanded of 
debtors was subject to the all-but-unfettered discretion of the court, guided 
only by a frightening suggestion that the payment obligation could be ³up to 
70% of the debtor¶s net income.´37
Few debtors managed to clear the entry barrier to this new system, 
though those who did so seem largely to have succeeded in obtaining relief. 
It took seven years of operation for this new procedure to produce 100 cases 
admitted to the three-year payment plan phase, though 484 debtors had 
applied for such relief and only about 200 cases were fully administered 
(leaving a significant and persistent backlog).38 By the end of 2016, the total 
number of discharge applications over the ten-year life of the regime had 
risen to 1,855, with administered cases still lagging far behind at 685, of 
which 478 had been admitted to the payment plan phase.39 This methodical 
approach to case evaluation was apparently fairly successful, as only a 
handful of cases over the eleven-year life of this original procedure ended in 
default or withdrawal, and most admitted cases seem to have concluded with 
a granted discharge about three years later, suggesting that courts had 
exercised their discretion in imposing relatively judicious payment 
obligations.40
Digging a bit deeper reveals a stark local legal culture issue at the 
admissions stage. The admissions figures just mentioned produce an 
admissions rate of 70% of all administered cases from 2006 through 2016. 
35. Id   UHSHDOHG0DU  9ODGLtU.RUGRã	)LOLS 7DNiþ Resurrection of 
Personal Insolvencies in Slovakia? , EUROFENIX, Spring 2017, at 34. 
36. .RUGRã	7DNiþsupra note 35, at 34. 
37. Id.
38. These figures derive from annual bankruptcy case statistics published by the Slovak 
Ministry of Justice. See Konkurzné konania na okresných súdoch SR, MINISTERSTVO 
SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky 
/Informacie/Statistika-konkurznych-konani-OS.aspx [https://perma.cc/5J5Q-772X] [hereinafter 
Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics] (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in 
Slovakia from 2006 through 2012). 
39. See id. (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in Slovakia from 2006 
through 2016). 
40. See id. (compiling bankruptcy proceeding outcome statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through 
2016). 
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But in examining district-level rates among the eight districts adjudicating 
these cases, stark differences emerge. In the last six years of the original 
regime, the court in the capital region of Bratislava admitted 100% of 
administered cases, with the high-volume courts in Banská Bystrica and 
äLOLQDQRWIDUEHKLQG The district court in Trenþín, in contrast, admitted only 
33% of administered cases during this period (fewer than 20% before 
2015).41 The small number of cases makes these figures less compelling, but 
the differing admissions practices of these decision makers seem to fairly 
clearly reflect very different attitudes toward, most likely, quite similar 
debtors. Payment-plan practices likely also differed dramatically. Over the 
entire eleven-year period under the original law, only two debtors emerged 
with a discharge from the process in 7UHQþtQ, compared with five in 
Bratislava and thirty-eight in Banská Bystrica (percentages are difficult to 
determine here, but judging by any perspective, the ratios of success vary 
wildly across districts).42
The Slovak government set out in 2016 to rectify this sad situation and 
align Slovak practice with regimes that are more accommodating to debtors. 
The legislature quickly took up and adopted the Justice Ministry¶s bold 
revision of the bankruptcy law in November 2016, effective March 1, 2017.43
Departing from the European standard and all but abandoning fear of abuse, 
the new Slovak regime offers debtors a free choice between asset liquidation 
and immediate discharge or a five-year payment plan,44 parallel to the U.S. 
choice between chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors must be 
represented by the publicly supported Centre for Legal Aid,45 and the now 
UHGXFHG¼DSSOLFDWLRQ IHH FDQEH OHQWE\ WKH&HQWUH IRU UHSD\HQW LQ
installments over three years) to debtors unable to pay the fee immediately.46
To make liquidation an even more attractive option, the range of debtors¶
property exempt from liquidation has been expanded with a homestead 
H[HSWLRQRI¼LQXQHQFXEHUHGYDOXHLQDKRH47
41. See id. (providing discharge application and administration statistics by district from 2011 
through 2016). 
42. See id. (reporting discharge statistics by district from 2006 through 2016). 
43. See .RUGRã	7DNiþsupra note 35, at 34 (describing the implications of the amendment). 
44. =iNRQ þ  =] R NRQNXU]H D UHãWUXNWXUDOL]iFLL D R ]HQH D GRSOQHQt QLHNWRUêFK
zákonov [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and Supplementation of 
Several Other Laws] (Slovk.), https://www.noveaspi.sk/products/lawText/1/59304/1/2 
[https://perma.cc/WKK2-D6D6] (current version). 
45. Id. § 166k. 
46. CENTRUM PRÁVNEJ POMOCI, OSOBNÝ BANKROT 4±5 (2017) (Slovk.),
http://www.centrumpravnejpomoci.sk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Bro%C5%BE%C3%BAra-
OB-02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFR3-4WHV]. 
47. =iNRQþsupra note 44, § 167h(4). The Justice Ministry issued a press release on 
the new law and homestead exemption. Dostupnejší osobný bankrot, MINISTERSTVO 
SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (Mar. 1, 2017) (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk 
/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx?announcementID=2179 [https://perma.cc/XK7U-3L7G]. 
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In stark contrast with recent U.S. practice, Slovak lawmakers embedded 
in their new system a clear preference for quick liquidation-and-discharge 
relief, actively discouraging debtors from pursuing the payment plan route. 
For debtors who choose to preserve their nonexempt assets and propose a 
payment plan, the reserved budget for family support must cover the debtor¶s
family¶s housing and basic needs (still undefined in the law48) and offer 
creditors a minimum 30% dividend (and at least 10% more value than a 
liquidation would produce).49 For debtors whose disposable income does not 
appear sufficient to meet these thresholds, the statute directs the trustee to 
recommend that the debtor file a petition for bankruptcy liquidation.50
By the end of November 2017, the Centre for Legal Aid had registered 
nearly 63,000 consultations with debtors interested in the new discharge 
procedure.51 Over 8,000 petitions were filed in the first nine months of 
availability of the new processes, 7,800 seeking liquidation and discharge, 
and slightly more than 200 proposing a five-year payment plan.52 The courts 
quickly accelerated their formerly languid administration process, granting 
admission to 6,454 bankruptcy cases and 117 payment plan cases.53 Of these, 
about half of the bankruptcy cases have already closed with a discharge, 
while a payment plan has been confirmed in forty cases.54 In the nine months 
from March to November 2017, the number of petitions for bankruptcy 
exceeded the entire number filed in the eleven-year period of the old law by 
a factor of four. The number of cases admitted in the first nine months of the 
new procedure was 13.5 times as large as the total number admitted over the 
previous ten years, and 17 times as as many discharges have been granted.55
The new Slovak system is a unique example of the modern European retreat 
from fear of abuse and embrace of standardized, low-burden personal 
discharge. 
48. See 6LOYLD%HORYLþRYiNew Personal Insolvency Regime in Slovakia, 0-1-CEE! CENT. EUR.
LEGAL NEWS & VIEWS BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.ceelegalblog.com/2016/12/857/ 
[https://perma.cc/7MQ7-98WR] (noting that debtor living expenses are to be determined by trustees 
DQGFRXUWV³DQGOHW¶VKRSHWKH\LOOXVHWKHLUGLVFUHWLRQLVHO\´
49. =iNRQþsupra note 44, § 168c(4)±(5). 
50. Id. § 168c(7). 
51. Rok 2017 na ministerstve spravodlivosti, MINISTERSTVO SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ 
REPUBLIKY (Dec. 19, 2017) (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx 





55. See Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 38 (reporting bankruptcy admission and 
discharge statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through 2016); 2017 at the Ministry of Justice, supra note 
51 (reporting bankruptcy admission and discharge statistics from March through November of 
2017). 
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C. Poland 2009–2015 
A somewhat similar story played out in Poland, though over a shorter 
period of time. Poland¶s first consumer discharge law was adopted much later 
than the Slovak version, and it ran into serious trouble immediately. Effective 
at the end of March 2009,56 the Polish Law on Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation 
was supplemented to allow consumers to seek discharge relief, but, again, 
fear of abuse compelled legislators to place two major obstacles in the way 
of access to this relief. First, debtors had to establish that their insolvency 
resulted from exceptional circumstances entirely beyond their control.57 As 
if this were not sufficient to bar access to all but a small handful of applicants, 
admission also required a demonstration of sufficient assets to cover the costs 
of administration, which varied from case to case and were estimated at 
EHWHHQ¼,DQG¼,000.58
In the nearly four years from March 2009 through the end of 2012, just 
over 2,160 consumer debtors applied for discharge relief under the new law, 
but only sixty (2.8%) were admitted into the system.59 The Justice Ministry 
was not pleased. The Ministry proposed a reform, expressing its feeling that 
these statistics ³and legislative experiences of other countries show, the 
current restrictive approach envisaged in Polish law should be liberalized.´60
A little over a year later, a bill was on the floor of the legislature with an 
explanatory statement reminding lawmakers of the many benefits of 
consumer discharge law, observing that the Polish approach had failed due 
to the cost and qualification barriers noted above and aiming to ³reduce or 
completely remove´ these barriers.61 The bill traveled through the legislative 
process quickly, and legislators put fear of abuse behind them as they passed 
the liberalizing amendments into law at the end of August 2014, effective 
December 31, 2014.62 Meanwhile, statistics on the operation of the old law 
came to an ignominious end, with a total of 2,735 applications submitted over 
56. 0DUHN3RU]\FNL	$QQD5DFKDá Consumer Insolvency Proceedings in Poland 5 (Instytut 
Allerhanda, Working Paper 12/2015, 2015). 
57. 3UDRXSDGáRĞFLRH>%DQNUXSWF\DQG5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ/D@U']81USR]
$UW,3RO.DWDU]\QD.RáRG]LHMF]\NConsumer Bankruptcy in Poland, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 20, 20. 
58. .RáRG]LHMF]\Nsupra note 57, at 20.
59. See Ewidencja spraw upadáoĞciowych (w tym upadáoĞci konsumenckiej “of”) za lata 2005 –
2015, INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S35$:,('/,:2ĝ&,(Pol.), https://isws.ms.gov 
.pl/pl/baza-statystyczna/opracowania-wieloletnie/download,2853,56.html 
[https://perma.cc/GAN4-WSXM] (reporting bankruptcy applications and admissions in Poland 
from 2009 through 2012). 
60. MINISTERSTWO S35$:,('/,:ĝ&,, REKOMENDACJE Z(632à8 MINISTRA 
S35$:,('/,:2ĝ&, '6. NOWELIZACJI P5$:$ 83$'à2ĝ&,2:(*2 I NAPRAWCZEGO 270 (2012) 
(Pol.) (original in Polish). 
61. O zmianie ustawy ± 3UDRXSDGáRĞciowe i naprawcze oraz niektyrych innych ustaw [Bill 
Amending the Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law] (2014 Nr 2265) (Pol.) (original in Polish). 
62. 3RU]\FNL	5DFKDásupra note 56, at 5. 
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nearly six years and only 120 successfully admitted²an ultimate aggregate 
admission rate of just 4.4%.63
From 2015 forward, Polish debtors have been free to seek discharge 
relief so long as they did not cause their insolvency ³intentionally or as a 
result of gross negligence.´64 For debtors with limited assets, administration 
costs are initially covered by the state treasury (and the costly formality of 
publication of case information in newspapers was scrapped in favor of 
electronic publication to reduce expense).65 After liquidation of the debtor¶s
assets, Polish practice still follows the European norm of imposing a payment 
plan on debtors to earn their discharge, but both the term (up to three years, 
down from five in the earlier law) and payment amount are still left to 
unfettered court discretion.66 In a powerful move away from fear of abuse, 
however, the law explicitly recognizes that many debtors will lack payment 
capacity beyond meeting their basic needs, so it provides for an immediate 
discharge if the court finds that this is ³clearly shown.´67 For cases where a 
payment plan is imposed, it can be amended for improvements in the debtor¶s
payment capacity, but only for ³reasons other than an increase in 
remuneration for work or services personally performed by the debtor.´68
This provides a creative incentive for debtors to maximize their productivity 
immediately following insolvency proceedings. 
As in Slovakia, Polish debtors eagerly accepted the invitation to this 
newly liberalized relief. Already in the first year of the new Polish law, more 
than 5,600 debtors applied and 2,153 were admitted²nearly twenty times as 
many admitted cases as in the previous six years combined.69 Those figures 
nearly doubled again in 2016, with almost 8,700 applications and 4,447 
admission orders, and the acceptance rate rose above 50% for the first time.70
Many applications are still being rejected, but largely for incorrect 
completion of the forms,71 and the average four-month processing time for 
cases suggests that the admission rate will rise as the crush of new cases
63. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S35$:,('/,:2ĝ&,, supra note 59 
(presenting applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2014). 
64. O zmianie ustawy ± 3UDR XSDGáRĞciowe i naprawcze, ustawy o Krajowym Rejestrze 
Sądowym oraz ustawy o kosztach sądowych w sprawach cywilnych [Amendment to the Bankruptcy 
and Reorganization Law] (2014 r. DZ. U. poz. 1306), Art. 4914(1) (Pol.) [hereinafter Prawo 
XSDGáRĞciowe] (original in Polish). 
65. Id., Art. 4917(1), Art. 491163RU]\FNL	5DFKDásupra note 56, at 10, 29. 
66. 3UDRXSDGáRĞFLRHsupra note 64, Art. 49114, Art. 49115.
67. Id. at Art. 49116(1) (original in Polish). 
68. Id. at 64, Art. 49119(3) (original in Polish). 
69. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S35$:,('/,:2ĝ&,, supra note 59 
(providing applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2016). 
70. Id. Admissions levelled off in 2017 at just over 5,500, though with a sharp turn upward in 
the last three months of the year. 2017 upadáoĞü konsumencka, CENTRALNY Oĝ52'(.INFORMACJI 
GOSPODARCZEJ, http://www.coig.com.pl/2017-upadlosc-konsumencka-lista_osob 
.php [https://perma.cc/SR3D-WPAU]. 
71. INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S35$:,('/,:2ĝ&,, supra note 59. 
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makes its way through the procedure. Fear of abuse is in definite retreat in 
Poland. 
II. Most Recent Developments: Less Discretion, Less Fear of Abuse 
A. Russia 2015–2017 
Only two years old, the new Russian consumer bankruptcy system has 
already encountered and addressed the same cost impediments that hindered 
the operation of the Slovak and Polish systems. It also confronted an 
unexpected form of resistance when lower courts creatively interpreted the 
new law to prohibit use by most consumer debtors. Here again, in a decisive 
rejection of fear of abuse, the Russian Supreme Court last year put the system 
back on track to achieve its primarily rehabilitative purposes. 
In the transition back to a market-based economic system following 
decades of stagnation under Communism, Russia adopted a consumer 
bankruptcy law in December 2014, with a delayed effective date of 
October 1, 2015.72 This law carried few of the hallmarks of fear of abuse seen 
elsewhere. Though it appears to follow European standards by requiring 
debtors to relinquish both nonexempt asset value and some amount of future 
income, the income expropriation period seems to last only six months, and 
debtors are entitled to a nondiscretionary exemption of a statutorily 
determined portion of their income.73 So far so good. 
The ironic problem, as in Slovakia and Poland, seems to be money, as 
debtors have struggled to afford the costs of the procedure. In the first year 
of the law, of an estimated avalanche of 670,000 potential overindebted 
applicants, only 33,000 debtors petitioned for relief, only 14,800 cases were 
opened, and fewer than 500 made their way completely through the complex, 
ten-month-long average procedure.74 Lawmakers first thought cost barriers 
were keeping the sea of applicants back, so in November 2016 they reduced 
the filing fee from 6,000 rubles to a nominal 300 rubles (from about $244 to 
$12 at Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate (PPP)), effective January 1, 
2017.75 But by the end of the second year of the new law¶s operation, the total 
72. Jason J. Kilborn, Treating the New European Disease of Consumer Debt in a Post-
Communist State: The Groundbreaking New Russian Personal Insolvency Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT¶L
L. 655, 686 (2016). 
73. Id. at 698±700, 710±11. 
74. NataliLࢎ D6KYDEDXơUZhiznү vzaƱmy, ROS. GAZ. (Nov. 7, 2016) (Russ.), https://rg.ru 
/2016/11/07/sredi-rossijskih-grazhdan-okazalos-bankrotov-bolshe-chem-sredi-kompanij.html 
[https://perma.cc/47DW-PL7X]. 
75. *HRUJLƱ3DQLQKakie vazhnye zakony vstupiִ at v silu s 2017 goda, ROS. GAZ. (Dec. 28, 2016) 
(Russ.), https://rg.ru/2016/12/28/kakie-vazhnye-zakony-vstupiat-v-silu-s-2017 
-goda.html [https://perma.cc/2YEA-JQTA]. 
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number of consumer cases commenced had little more than doubled to just 
over 40,000.76
The reduction in filing fees was merely a drop in the bucket compared 
to the real problem: the cost of the required ³financial administrator,´ set by 
statute at 25,000 rubles (about $1,000 at PPP) but in reality often higher, and 
other administrative expenses reportedly boost the total cost of a personal 
bankruptcy filing to at least 100,000 rubles in Moscow ($4,000 PPP) and at 
least 60,000 rubles in provincial regions (about $2,500 PPP).77 This is in 
addition to the logistical challenge of filing a bankruptcy case in the often 
distant commercial courts, only one of which is located in each ³subject´
(governmental region) of Russia¶s expansive territory.78
Both the cost factor and another less obvious obstacle to relief were 
revealed as serious doctrinal problems when one of the first cases under the 
new law made its way to the Russian Supreme Court.79 Two months after the 
effective date of the new law, the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Court in the remote 
Western Siberian Tyumen Oblast opened a personal bankruptcy case only to 
close it five months later on two grounds, both related to the absence of any 
substantial asset value in the case.80 First, the court felt that the absence of 
sufficient asset value to offer even a partial distribution to unsecured creditors 
undermined the very purpose, in its view, of the bankruptcy law²that is, to 
offer proportionate satisfaction of creditors¶ claims from the debtor¶s assets.81
Second, insufficient asset value to pay administrative costs constitutes a basis 
for case closure under Article 57 of the Law on Insolvency, and the court 
held that funds could not be advanced by a nondebtor to cover these costs.82
The Supreme Court struck back at these philosophical constraints on the 
new law and dealt another blow to fear of abuse of consumer discharge. 
Consumer bankruptcy has other purposes, the Court asserted, beyond 
satisfying creditors. Access to legislatively prescribed relief cannot be 
restricted simply on the basis that the debtor has no asset value to offer 
creditors, and this cannot be equated to ³bad faith,´ more specific evidence 
76. 7DWމLࢎ ana Zamakhia, Dobrosovestnym grazhdanam predlozhili spisatү dolgi, ROS. GAZ.
(Nov. 8, 2017) (Russ.), https://rg.ru/2017/11/08/dobrosovestnym-grazhdanam-predlozhili-spisat-
dolgi.html [https://perma.cc/LVG2-P67P]. 
77. 7DWމLࢎ ana Zykova, Bolүshe ne dolzhen, ROS. GAZ. (Jan. 12, 2017) (Russ.), 
https://rg.ru/2017/01/12/chislo-bankrotov-v-rossii-za-poslednie-3-mesiaca-vyroslo-na-27.html 
[https://perma.cc/8RL9-VG29]. 
78. Kilborn, supra note 72, at 691±93. 
79. 2SUHGHOHQLH 9HUNKRYQ\Ʊ 6XG 5RVVLƱVNRƱ )HGHUDWࢎ sii ot 23 Lࢎ avara 2017 [Decision of the 
Russian Federation Supreme Court of Jan. 23, 2017], N. 304-ƠS16-14541, Delo N. A70-
14095/2015. 2017 (Russ.). 
80. Id. at 2±3. 
81. Id. at 2. 
82. Id.
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of which is required to deny a discharge.83 And while debtors must, indeed, 
somehow cover the administrative costs of the proceeding (which at the time 
were much smaller than now, with only a 10,000 ruble fee for the financial 
administrator), the Court pointed out that the law contained no provision 
forbidding debtors from seeking help from third parties in covering these 
fees.84
For debtors without generous friends, the law does indeed still require 
full payment of administrative costs,85 which clearly remains a deterrent for 
many debtors, as it was in Slovakia and Poland. Fortunately, the Ministry of 
Economic Development has already proposed a simplification of the 
procedure²mainly exclusion of the costly financial administrator²for cases 
involving debtors with limited debts and assets (less than 900,000 rubles of 
debt, about $37,000 at PPP, fewer than ten creditors, and income less than 
the statutory minimum livable income).86 This further step away from fear of 
abuse has been met with some resistance, so this will be a developing story 
to watch in 2018 and beyond. Incidentally, lawmakers in neighboring 
Ukraine have long agitated for a personal bankruptcy law as well, but to date, 
they have not progressed beyond the stage of a draft bill, the most notable of 
which has been pending for two years.87
B. Austria 1995–2017 
Perhaps the biggest change ushered in at the start of the new year is a 
major withdrawal from fear of abuse at the culmination of a long-fought 
battle in Austria. This is one of the small handful of consumer discharge 
regimes that was already in operation beginning in 1995, before Jay wrote 
his commentary, and it exemplifies the fear of abuse that he discerned in 
Europe at the time. For over twenty years, the Austrian procedure imposed 
three classic European hurdles to deter feared abuse by consumer debtors. 
After decades of criticism by counseling centers and other observers,88 each 
83. Id. at 3 (original in Russian). 
84. Id. at 4. 
85. )HGHUDOމQ\Ʊ =DNRQ R 1HVRVtoLࢎ DWHOމQRVWL %DQNURWVWYH >)HGHUDO /D RQ ,QVROYHQF\
(Bankruptcy)], N 127-FZ. st. 57(1) (Russ.); see also Zykova, supra note 77 (noting that the 
administrator can request case closure at any point if his fees and expenses are not paid by the 
debtor). 
86. Elena Berezina & Irina Zhandarova, Vernutү vse, ROS. GAZ. (Mar. 13, 2017) (Russ.), 
https://rg.ru/2017/03/13/grazhdanam-uprostiat-bankrotstva.html [https://perma.cc/ZV55-Z7HH]; 
Zykova, supra note 77. 
87. 1DWDOމLࢎ a MyWࢎ skovskaLࢎ a, Kak statү bankrotom: novyƱ zakon mozִhet pomochү yzbavytүsiִ a ot 
nevyplachennykh dolhov, KOMSOMOLމSKA,ࢎA PRAVDA V UKRAYNE (Nov. 15, 2017) (Ukr.), https:// 
kp.ua/print/economics/592146-kak-stat-bankrotom-novyi-zakon-mozhet-pomoch-yzbavytsia-ot-
nevyplachennykh-dolhov [https://perma.cc/K28J-M8A5]. 
88. E.g., ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, SCHULDENREPORT 2016 14, 18 (2016) (Austria) 
(calling for overdue reforms in Austrian insolvency law); Christiane Moser, Österreich: Reform des 
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of these three obstacles was cleared away by near-unanimous legislative 
reform effective November 1, 2017.89
First, like in Poland and Russia, the Austrian law originally required 
debtors to pay at least the administrative costs of the proceeding. For those 
unable to do so immediately upon applying for relief, such debtors had to 
comply with another prerequisite: a mandatory attempt to work out their debt 
problems privately through an out-of-court negotiation with creditors.90 This 
negotiation was, unsurprisingly, very seldom successful, so in the reform it 
was finally scrapped.91 Austria thus joins Sweden in having abandoned 
mandatory debt counseling and negotiation as a prerequisite for formal 
consumer insolvency relief.92
Second, like virtually every European consumer discharge regime, the 
Austrian procedure requires both a liquidation of nonexempt assets and a 
payment plan. Historically, most such plans were accepted by a vote of 
creditors. Debtors had to propose to pay creditors an amount equal to five 
years¶ worth of their projected nonexempt income, and they could string out 
those payments over as many as seven years to lighten the burden.93 Such a 
plan is accepted by an affirmative vote of creditors who represent a majority 
in number and amount of the claims of all voting creditors.94 While the great 
majority (70%) of Austrian personal insolvency cases in the past have 
concluded with such a court-mediated payment plan,95 low-income debtors 
have been largely shut out of the process by the unique final minimum-
payment hurdle discussed below. With the reform to allow low-income 
debtors realistic access to relief, the necessity to propose a payment plan for 
creditor voting has now been limited to debtors with substantial nonexempt 
Privatkonkurses überfällig, DAS BUDGET, no. 78, 2016, at 6, 6 (Austria) (noting that Austria is 
lagging behind in private bankruptcy reform). 
89. Clemens Mitterlehner & Christa Kerschbaummayr, Reform of Personal Bankruptcy 
Procedure in Austria, MONEY MATTERS, no. 15, 2017, at 8, 8. 
90. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993 [BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT OF 1993]
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 974/1993, § 183(2) (Austria), https://www.ris.bka 
.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1993_974_0/1993_974_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B79C-HTTF]. 
91. Philipp Wetter, Austria: Major Changes in Personal Bankruptcy Law, SCHOENHERR 
(July 4, 2017), https://www.schoenherr.eu/si/publications/publication-detail/austria-major 
-changes-in-personal-bankruptcy-law/ [https://perma.cc/32US-3T5X]. 
92. Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines 
Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the Learning Curve? , 80 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 435, 458 (2006). 
93. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, §§ 193(1), 194(1). 
94. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2010 [IRbG 2010] [INSOLVENCY LAW 
AMENDMENT 2010] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 29/2010, § 147(1) (Austria), https://www 
.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_I_29/BGBLA_2010_I_29.html 
[https://perma.cc/3JXX-4ALX]. 
95. GEORG KODEK, HANDBUCH PRIVATKONKURS: DIE SONDERBESTIMMUNGEN FUR DAS 
INSOLVENZVERFAHREN NATÜRLICHER PERSONEN 384 tbl.C.3 (2015). 
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income. That is, debtors with little or no nonexempt income can proceed 
immediately to the final stage, a court-imposed earned discharge period.96
This earned discharge period and its culmination were the subjects of 
the third and most substantial reform. Neither the length of this period nor 
the amounts demanded from debtors were ever subject to any notable degree 
of court discretion. Originally, debtors formally assigned to a trustee all of 
their actual income in excess of an objective statutory ³existence minimum´
amount for seven years.97 An additional requirement echoed the sentiment of 
the Russian Tyumen Oblast Court discussed above regarding the purpose of 
bankruptcy: at the conclusion of this seven-year period, Austrian debtors 
received a discharge only if they had paid off administrative costs and 
produced a dividend of 10% of unsecured creditors¶ claims.98 Debtors who 
missed this mark only slightly could hope for a hardship discharge at court 
discretion, perhaps after an additional three-year period of toil and sacrifice, 
but the discharge could be and sometimes was denied to debtors who failed 
to produce a satisfactory dividend for creditors.99 Many more low-income 
debtors were doubtless deterred from even attempting to obtain discharge 
relief, knowing they likely could not cover costs and produce the minimum 
10% dividend for creditors.100
As of November 1, 2017, in a tectonic shift from longtime fear to full 
acceptance of consumer discharge, Austrian legislators scrapped the 10% 
minimum dividend, softened the requirement to cover administrative costs, 
and reduced the earned discharge period from seven to five years.101 At the 
conclusion of the now five-year period, the court enters a discharge 
regardless of whether the debtor has covered costs and produced a dividend 
for creditors.102 Administrative costs that cannot be covered by debtors are 
advanced from the state Treasury, to be collected from the proceeds of 
liquidation of debtors¶ nonexempt assets or collection of nonexempt 
income.103 If the debtor¶s asset value and five years of nonexempt payments 
96. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2017 [IRbG 2017] [INSOLVENCY LAW 
AMENDMENT 2017] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 122/2017, §§ 193(1), 194(1) (Austria), 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_122/BGBLA_2017_I_122.html 
[https://perma.cc/LWF7-RPRE]. 
97. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, § 199(2). 
98. Id. §§ 194, 213. 
99. Id.
100. See ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, supra note 88, at 14±15 (discussing the 10% 
minimum); KODEK, supra note 95, at 165±202, 249±338. 
101. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2017, supra note 96, §§ 199(2), 213(1).
102. Id. § 213(1). 
103. INSOLVENZORDNUNG [INSOLVENCY CODE] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL]
no. 122/2017, as amended, § 184(1)±(2) (Austria) https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe 
?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001736&FassungVom=2017-10-31 
[https://perma.cc/WEG7-86U2]. 
1344 Texas Law Review [Vol. 96:1327 
have not managed to cover administrative costs, the debtor remains liable to 
cover those costs only ³if and when he is in a position to do so without 
impairment of his [and his family¶s] necessary support.´104 Even this 
obligation prescribes (i.e., is barred by a statutory limitations period) three 
years after the conclusion of the proceedings.105 The Czech Republic now 
stands alone in the European Union with a law that requires a minimum 
dividend to unsecured creditors (30%) for consumer debtors to earn their 
discharge.106 Perhaps not enough time has passed for fear of abuse to abate 
since the Czech consumer discharge became available in 2008, but one hopes 
the Czech Republic will follow Austria¶s example in far less than the twenty-
two years it took for Austria to do so. 
C. Croatia 2016, Romania 2018 
The two newest consumer discharge procedures in Europe reveal a bit 
of unfortunate backpedaling toward fear of abuse, though there is good 
reason to expect that discretion will be exercised sparingly and within 
relatively narrow boundaries in these two latecomer systems. Both will be 
unfolding stories to watch in the years to come. 
1. Croatia.—Croatia was the most recent European Union Member 
State to adopt a consumer bankruptcy procedure, effective January 1, 2016.107
It immediately took two steps backward toward fear of abuse by adopting the 
prereform Austrian procedure, minus the minimum dividend to creditors. Not 
learning from the repeated failures of these processes in neighboring regions, 
Croatian legislators reimposed two futile access restrictions just abandoned 
by Austria, along with what seems like a fairly menacing multiyear payment 
obligation. 
First, Croatian debtors can gain entry to the in-court discharge procedure 
only after engaging a counseling center to propose an out-of-court settlement 
plan to creditors.108 When the counseling center inevitably concludes that this 
effort is doomed to failure, it issues a certificate to that effect, which the 
debtor must present within three months with a petition for bankruptcy 
104. Id. § 184(3). 
105. Id.
106. KILBORN, supra note 29, at 30, 37. 
107. Zakon o steþaju potrošaþa [Law on Consumer Bankruptcy], NN 100/2015 (1936) (Croat.); 
Emir Bahtijarevic & Ema Mendusic Skugor, New Insolvency Legislation to Thoroughly Change 
Bankruptcy Procedures in Croatia, CEE LEGAL MATTERS, Feb. 2016, at 88, 88. 
108. OZREN I9.29,û & MARKO KRUC, SCHONHERR, CROATIA: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
ACT INTRODUCES CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY INTO THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2016), https://www 
.schoenherr.eu/uploads/tx_news/Croatia_Consumer_Bankruptcy_final_pdf3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W45U-U3KL]. 
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relief.109 The state agency that oversees these counselors, the Financial 
Agency (FINA), has released statistical data on the first two years of the new 
Croatian procedure indicating that a total of 1,159 debtors have engaged 
counseling centers to initiate the out-of-court process.110 These debtors had 
an average of only six creditors and mostly quite small debts, but in only one
case were all creditors somehow convinced to sign onto the debtor¶s
proposed settlement plan (and in only sixteen cases was an agreement 
reached even with some of the debtor¶s creditors).111 Certificates of failure 
had thus been issued to 795 debtors, with the same result most likely awaiting 
most or all of the remaining applicants.112
Second, to gain access to the formal discharge procedure, debtors must 
again present a settlement plan to creditors in an in-court process. Only after 
that effort inevitably fails again, a liquidation of the debtor¶s nonexempt 
assets ensues, and like in Austria, Croatian debtors are relegated to an 
additional ³behaviour checking´ period of between one and five years.113
While the law appears to leave the precise duration of this period to judicial 
discretion, it seems likely that courts will in most cases choose the maximum 
five-year term. This was the result in the very first personal bankruptcy case 
in Croatia, where a fifty-one-year-old former entrepreneur with no assets and 
only pension income was assigned a five-year term from which she filed an 
appeal for a reduction to a year and a half.114 During this period, debtors are 
subject to a nondiscretionary requirement of turnover of all income above the 
statutory exemption. The Croatian statutory minimum income figures seem 
far less livable than their Austrian equivalents, with one Croatian journalist 
characterizing them as ³neoliberal euthanasia.´115 This likely explains why 
only a fraction of the expected 10,000±20,000 potential debtors have applied 
for relief.116 In this respect, the newest European consumer discharge system 
109. Id.
110. FINANCIJSKA AGENCIJA (FINA), PREGLED ZBIRNIH PODATAKA IZ SUSTAVA PROVEDBE 
S7(ý$-$32752â$ý$=$RAZDOBLJE OD 1.1.2016. DO 03.04.2018. GODINE 2 (2018) (Croat.), http:// 
www.fina.hr/lgs.axd?t=16&id=19566 [https://perma.cc/J4YR-U2LM]. 
111. Id. at 2, 7. 
112. Id. at 7. 
113. I9.29,û& KRUC, supra note 108. 
114. See /MXELFD *DWDULü Prva u osobni bankrot otišla propala poduzetnica iz Krapine,
V(ý(51-,/,67 (Oct. 17, 2016) (Croat.), https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/prva-u-osobni-bankrot 
-otisla-propala-poduzetnica-iz-krapine-1121543 [https://perma.cc/7FKP-QUE9] (reporting the 
GHWDLOVRI&URDWLD¶VILUVWSHUVRQDOEDQNUXSWF\FDVH
115. See Leo Buljan, Možete li preživjeti s 800 kuna mjeseþno?  Ako potpišete osobni steþaj, 
bolje da nauþite!, PORTAL DNEVNO (June 26, 2014) (Croat.), http://www.dnevno.hr/novac/mozete-
li-prezivjeti-s-800-kuna-mjesecno-ako-potpisete-osobni-stecaj-bolje-da-naucite-126174/ 
[https://perma.cc/APA5-RYJR] (original in Croatian) (citing minimum income figures of $133 per 
month for the debtor, $80 for an adult family member, and $53 for each child (not at PPP)). 
116. See I9.29,û& KRUC, supra QRWH³$FFRUGLQJWRWKH0LQLVWU\VRHKHUHEHWHHQ
10,000 and 20,000 of the indebteGFLWL]HQVLJKWWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKLVRSSRUWXQLW\´
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may reveal something of a resurgence of fear of abuse, though not in the guise 
of judicial discretion. 
2. Romania.—Meanwhile, the latest European consumer discharge sys- 
tem to actually begin operations has just come online in Romania as of Jan-
uary 1, 2018. While the Romanian legislature unanimously adopted its Law 
no. 151/2015 ³on the insolvency procedure of natural persons´ in June 
2015,117 the government pushed back the effective date several times.118 This 
delay was attributable in part to government efforts to constrain discretion in 
evaluating debtors¶ capacities to support settlement plans with creditors and 
to endure a multiyear earned discharge period. 
The Romanian law adopts the French approach119 of routing debtors 
through standing insolvency commissions, which evaluate whether cases 
should be directed to a negotiation with creditors and a potential five-year 
payment plan, or, for debtors whose financial situation is ³irremediably 
compromised,´ to a liquidation-and-discharge procedure.120 In performing 
the sensitive and critical evaluation of debtors¶ payment capacities that 
determines which path is pursued, the insolvency commissions are not left to 
their own devices; rather, the Ministry of Justice directed the chair of the 
central insolvency commission to publish detailed criteria for determining a 
³reasonable standard of living´ for debtors in insolvency proceedings. These 
criteria must be based on a list of national economic benchmarks, including 
cost-of-living indices, various family and household compositions, and 
transportation and housing guidelines.121 The publication of these criteria 
seems to have been delayed as of this writing, but the effort to constrain 
discretion and contain fear of abuse is manifest. 
If Romanian institutions embrace the French approach to the notion of 
³irremediably compromised´ debtors (as seems highly likely), many if not 
most debtors will be routed to an immediate liquidation-and-discharge 
117. /HJLLSULYLQGSURFHGXUDLQVROYHQ܊HLSHUVRDQHORUIL]LFH>/DRQWKH,QVROYHQF\
3URFHGXUH RI 1DWXUDO 3HUVRQV@ SXEOLFDWă vQ 0RQLWRUul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 
464/26.06.2015 (Rom.); Mihaela Condrache & Liviana Andreea NimineĠ, Personal Bankruptcy and 
the Romanian Realities, STUD. & SCI. RES., no. 22, 2015, at 7, 8. 
118. See, e.g., 2UGRQDQ܊ăGHXUJHQ܊ăSHQWUXSURURJDUHDWHUHQXOXLGHLQWUDUHvQYLJRDUHD/HJLL
QUSULYLQGSURFHGXUDLQVROYHQ܊HLSHUVRDQHORUIL]LFH>*RYHUQHQW(HUJHQF\2UGLQDQFH
for the extension of the entry into force of Law no. 151/2015 on insolvency procedure of natural 
persons] SXEOLFDWăvQ0RQLWRUXO2ILFLDODO5RkQLHL3DUWHD I, nr. 962/24.12.2015 (Rom.). 
119. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34±WUDFLQJWKHGHYHORSHQWRI)UDQFH¶V commission-
EDVHGDSSURDFKWRSURFHVVLQJGHEWRUV¶FDVHV
120. Condrache & NimineĠ, supra note 117, at 9±11. 
121. +RWăUkUH  SHQWUX DSUREDUHD 1RUHORU HWRGRORJLFH GH DSOLFDUH D /HJLL QU
SULYLQG SURFHGXUD LQVROYHQĠHL SHUVRDQHORU IL]LFH >'HFLVLRQ$SSURYLQJ0HWKRGRORJLFDO
Norms for the Application of Law on the Insolvency oI1DWXUDO3HUVRQV@SXEOLFDWăvQ0RQLWRUXO
Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 436/13.06.2017, art. 2 (Rom.). 
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procedure.122 The insolvency commissions can send particularly low-income, 
elderly debtors to simplified proceedings, which require a simple observation 
period of three years before a final discharge is granted.123 For all others, the 
asset liquidation is followed by a payment period, during which a court-
determined proportion of the debtor¶s income in excess of reasonable living 
expenses must be paid to creditors.124 This proportion is determined in 
accordance with the published budgetary guidelines for a ³reasonable 
standard of living.´125 The duration of the payment period is determined by 
the percentage of debts paid off²as little as one year if 50% of debts are paid 
within that time²but given the finances of most debtors, the most common 
objectively determined term will be five years for debtors unable to produce 
at least a 40% dividend.126 These nondiscretionary and sensitive terms for 
earning discharge relief reflect further relaxation of fear of abuse at the most 
recent launch of a consumer insolvency system. 
III. Consumer Discharge-in-Waiting: Fear of Abuse Manifest in Laws in 
Development 
In countries that have not by this point followed the personal bankruptcy 
trend sweeping across Europe, one would expect to find a great deal of 
resistance to the notion of offering such relief. A resurgence of fear of abuse 
is fairly obvious in the last European straggler, Bulgaria, where proposed 
bills reflect this fear in objective, but all-but-insurmountable, barriers to 
relief. Beyond Europe, advanced-stage proposals developing in China and 
Saudi Arabia confirm that newcomers to personal discharge approach the 
policy conversation with great hesitancy.  
A. Bulgaria 
In 2000, household debt was hardly a blip on the social policy radar 
screen in Bulgaria. By 2008, household debt had exploded and while still not 
reaching the worrying levels of some other European states, had risen to and 
remained at a level that caught the attention of policymakers.127 Concerned 
122. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34±35 (describing the increasing number of cases 
adminLVWHUHGXQGHU)UDQFH¶V³SHUVRQDOUHFRYHU\´SURFHGXUHIRUGHEWRUVKRVHILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQLV
³LUUHHGLDEO\ FRSURLVHG´ -DVRQ - .LOERUQ Determinants of Failure . . . and Success in 
Personal Debt Mediation, TRANSNAT¶L DISP. MGMT. Nov. 2017 at 1, 11±12 (discussing the growth 
RI)UDQFH¶VEDQNUXSWF\FRLVVLRQUHJLH
123. /HJLLSULYLQGSURFHGXUDLQVROYHQ܊HLSHUVRDQHORUIL]LFHsupra note 117, arts. 65±
70.
124. Id. art. 57(1)(b). 
125. Id. art. 3(25) (original in Romanian). 
126. See id. art. 72 (prescribing the procedure IRU GHWHULQLQJ WKH GXUDWLRQ RI D GHEWRU¶V
payment period). 
127. See Miroslav Nikolov, Households Indebtedness: State-of-the-Art, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 7, 8 fig.3 (illustrating the sizeabOHJURWKLQ%XOJDULD¶VKRXVHKROGGHEWEHWHHQ
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Bulgarian legislators finally introduced a bill in February 2015 to provide 
³protection against overindebtedness of natural persons´ in the form of a 
cost-free, European-style procedure of asset liquidation followed by a three-
year earned discharge period of relinquishment of nonexempt income.128 The 
explanatory note to the bill commented that ³[t]he public interest requires 
µeternal debtors¶ to be given an opportunity to engage anew in socially 
beneficial activity,´ consistent with European practice.129
This controversial bill made no progress before another was introduced 
on July 21, 2017. The tone and approach of this new bill are quite different 
from its predecessor¶s: debtors are deemed overindebted and allowed access 
to relief only if they have worked consistently during three of the preceding 
five years, their debts do not exceed 150,000 Bulgarian levs (about $95,000), 
and they nonetheless appear unable to pay their debts with ten years of 
expected income.130 In such cases, the earned discharge period would be ten 
years on minimum income.131 Moreover, during this ten-year period, debtors 
are prohibited from entrepreneurial activity as members or directors of 
companies.132 Excluding retired people and long-term unemployed debtors 
and calling on ten years of earning capacity is sure to produce a remedy for 
very few maladies. One suspects Bulgaria is still some distance from a 
consumer discharge law of any kind, let alone an effective one. One can just 
picture the fear in legislators¶ eyes! 
B. China 
A most exciting recent development in China comes not from a central 
government project, but from a controlled provincial experiment. While 
China is in principle a highly centralized state, central authorities often afford 
significant autonomy to regional governments to pursue large-scale trial runs 
of new policies. Nowhere is this trend more powerful and more obvious than 
in the ³special economic zones´ developed during the period of ³reform and 
opening´ initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.133 Deng¶s famous ³southern 
2000 and 2008); Bulgaria Household Debt 2000–2016, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en 
/indicator/bulgaria/household-debt [https://perma.cc/STW7-L7ZN] (reporting that %XOJDULD¶V
KRXVHKROGGHEW³UHDFKHGDQDOO-WLHKLJK´LQ'HFHEHURI
128. 3URHNW =DNRQ ]D ]DVKWLWD SUL VYUǎNK]DGǎO]KHQRVW QD IL]LFKHVNLWH OLWࢎ sa [Draft, Law of 
Protection Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 554-01-30 ot 12/02/2015, arts. 3(2), 6, 
16, 26 (Bulg.). 
129. Id., Notes at 12 (original in Bulgarian). 
130. Bill, =DNRQ]D]DVKWLWDSULVYUǎNK]DGǎO]KHQRVWQDIL]LFKHVNLWHOLWࢎ sa [Bill, Law of Protection 
Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 754-01-46 ot 24/07/2017, arts. 4(1), 5 (Bulg.). 
131. Id. art. 22(1), 30. 
132. Id. art. 31. 
133. ARTHUR R. KROEBER, CHINA¶S ECONOMY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 5 (2016). 
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tour´ in 1992 took him to one of the most prominent of these zones, 
Shenzhen, just to the north of Hong Kong.134
This hotbed of economic development and local initiative appears to be 
the likely future birthplace of personal bankruptcy law in China. In June 
2014, a subgroup of the Shenzhen Bar Association began developing a 
personal bankruptcy bill for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.135 A draft 
law emerged by September 2015, with some unique and intriguing provisions 
that suggest Shenzhen authorities are stepping lightly into this new legal 
terrain.136
A preliminary review of the proposed law, working from this author¶s
rather rudimentary foundation in Chinese, reveals what seem to be fairly 
rigorous and restrictive requirements for accessing the procedure and 
obtaining relief. To access the personal liquidation process, debtors must 
submit evidence of five years of income and expenditures (which presumably 
indicate their payment ability and substantiate their claimed inability to clear 
their debts timely), and their current standard of living must not exceed a 
level corresponding to the local minimum wage.137 The draft law seems to 
require the debtor to pay creditors the value of any nonexempt property²
including disposable income²the debtor reasonably anticipates receiving 
over the next two years, which must in any case suffice immediately to cover 
administrative costs.138
The discharge provision is a bit puzzling, but it seems to require a 
minimum distribution to creditors of at least the amount distributed to them 
by the debtor during the two-year period preceding the debtor¶s filing an 
application for liquidation; otherwise, a discharge is conferred only by the 
(extremely unlikely) unanimous vote of the creditors¶ committee.139 This 
134. Id. at 7. 
135. SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU GEREN POCHAN TIAOLI CAO¶AN JIANYI GAO FU LIYOU (῝ᆆ㓿
⍾≉༊୭ே◚ӗ᮲౛ⲡ᱌ᘓ䇞✏㝃⌮⏤) [SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY REGULATION DRAFT PROPOSAL WITH ACCOMPANYING REASONING]  (Lu Lin 
(঒ᯘ), ed., 2016) (China) [hereinafter Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal]; see also “Shenzhen 
Jingji Tequ Geren Pochan Tiaolì” Dashiji (ࠓ῝ᆆ㓿⍾≉༊୭ே◚ӗ᮲౛ࠔ኱஦䇠) [“Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone Personal Bankruptcy Ordinance” Retrospective], JIANGSU HUIJIN BANKR.
LIQUIDATION FIRM LTD. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.js-hj.com/content/?190.html 
[https://perma.cc/MAC3-AMC7] [hereinafter JIANGSU HUIJIN] (China) (providing a timeline of the 
development of the Shenzhen bankruptcy proposal). 
136. JIANGSU HUIJIN, supra note 135. 
137. Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal, supra note 135, arts. 95, 103. 
138. Id. arts. 111, 113±16, 120. 
139. Id. arts. 158±59. This unique discharge provision seems to be based on the discharge 
provision of the Taiwan Consumer Insolvency Act of 2008. Xiaofeizhe Zhaiwu Qingli Tiaoli 
(ভඇं࠶ແੜཀྵᑏྭ) [Consumer Debt Clean-Up Regulation] (amended Dec. 26, 2010), art. 133 
(Taiwan, officially Republic of China), https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawParaDeatil.aspx 
?Pcode=B0010042&LCNOS=++80+++&LCC=2 [https://perma.cc/X5FR-ZEW9]. 
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provision could spell trouble for any potential discharge procedure, and it 
suggests a deep fear of abuse by opportunistic debtors. Indeed, since 2013, 
the current nationwide approach to defaulting debtors in China has been a 
Supreme Court blacklist banning some debtors from using such ³luxuries´ as 
airplane and high-speed-train travel and hotels.140 Time will tell whether the 
Shenzhen draft or something like it becomes law and, if so, how it is applied 
by Chinese courts who seem to be both wholly unaccustomed to and quite 
skeptical of the concept of relief for defaulting debtors. 
C. Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry delivered a bombshell 
when in April 2015 it released a policy paper on an initiative to revamp the 
Kingdom¶s insolvency law.141 That paper projected that a new procedure 
would encompass all private individuals, including ordinary consumers, and 
would offer an automatic discharge of unpaid liabilities following a 
liquidation and waiting period of twelve months.142 Another comment 
expectedly but ominously noted that ³Shari¶a compliance would be an 
important element when choosing public policies and the underlying 
rules.´143 This is ominous because no school of Islamic Law (shari¶ah)
seemed to support or even accept the notion of discharging debts without the 
consent of creditors.144 An imprint of the name of a Western law firm 
(Clifford Chance) on every page of the English portion of the policy paper 
offered reason for hope, however, so the announcement of a potential Islamic 
discharge was both confusing and exciting. 
As it turned out, the Western law firm had apparently not sufficiently 
appreciated the implications of shari¶ah compliance. The ultimate draft law 
released in September 2016 indeed adhered to Islamic Law and did not offer 
a nonconsensual discharge.145 The explanatory note to the new draft makes 
140. See Yongxi Chen & Anne Sy Cheung, The Transparent Self Under Big Data Profiling: 
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System, 12 J. COMP. L., no. 2, 2017, at 356, 
362, 370 (describing travel restrictions on judgment defaulters and public disclosures of public 
credit information); Yuan Yang, China Penalizes 6.7m Debtors with Travel Ban, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. UHSRUWLQJWKDWDDQVXUQDHG/LX³DORVWORVWKLVEULGHDIWHUWKHDQ¶VIDWKHU . . . 
DV QDHG RQ WKH ORFDO WHOHYLVLRQ DV EHLQJ EODFNOLVWHG´ KWWSVIWFRFRQWHQWFHEDI-
f350-11e6-8758-6876151821a6 [https://perma.cc/FUF3-AQSU]. 
141. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA INSOLVENCY LAW
PROJECT, POLICY PAPER (2016) (Saudi Arabia), http://mci.gov.sa/LawsRegulations/Projects/Pages 
/ippd.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/BV7Y-PQGH]. 
142. Id. §§ 4.1±4.5. 
143. Id. § 1.2(b)(iii). 
144. Abed Awad & Robert E. Michael, Iflas and Chapter 11: Classical Islamic Law and 
Modern Bankruptcy, 44 INT¶L LAWYER 975, 981, 997, 999 (2010); Jason J. Kilborn, Foundations 
of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources, Methodology, Diversity, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
323, 347 (2011). 
145. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS.0DVKUX¶1L]DDO-Iflaas [Draft of the System of 
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no mention of the Western concept. The provisions on liquidation do apply 
to ordinary individuals, but the ³rehabilitation´ article is quite clear that 
following a liquidation of nonexempt assets, the debtor ³is not discharged 
from his liability for remaining debt except for under a special or general 
discharge from creditors.´146 In other words, perfectly consistent with Islamic 
Law, the new Saudi bankruptcy law offers individual debtors a discharge 
only with the consent of creditors, which one suspects is unlikely to be 
forthcoming. The current draft is reportedly on its way to becoming law in 
early 2018,147 leaving Saudi Arabia without consumer discharge. While 
adherence to Islamic Law may not be fairly equated with fear of abuse, there 
is a congruent reticence here to allow debtors to evade their obligations over 
creditor opposition²a reticence that appears likely to persist indefinitely in 
the Kingdom.148
Conclusion 
Virtually none of the developments described here would have a 
counterpart in U.S. experience. Even the advent of the infamous means test 
for constraining access to quick chapter 7 relief is of a very different nature 
than the aggressive constraints on consumer discharge access witnessed in 
Europe over the past twenty years. Following these comparative 
developments (in English) has allowed policymakers and academics 
worldwide to explore more deeply and in greater detail the fear of abuse that 
Jay observed in the United States and Europe in the late 1990s, along with its 
gradual but definite abatement in recent years. Comparative analysis has 
greatly enriched the conversation about the proper balance of relief, 
restriction, and responsibility with the ³rich harvest of new evidence´ that 
Jay predicted. I am thrilled to have been part of that harvest and to say, once 
again, thanks, Jay! 
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